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内  容  摘  要 
随着中国股市的跨越式发展，已上市的国有商业银行（中国建设银行、中国
银行和中国工商银行）已和花旗银行、汇丰银行等国际大银行一样，成为全球市























































































With the leaping development of the stock market in China, the listed 
state-owned commercial banks in China (China Construction Bank, Bank of China 
and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China) have become global top ten commercial 
banks with highest market value as Citibank and HSBC. However the highest market 
value does not represent the highest value. In recent years, “Bank value 
maximization” has gradually become the operation objective for commercial banks. 
However, neither the academic field nor the practical field has made a clear definition 
and systematic study on “what is the bank value” and “how to maximize the bank 
value”. This paper attempts to answer and analyze the previously mentioned two 
questions.  
This paper holds that a steadily operated state-owned commercial bank should 
not just pursue the maximization of short-term value, but attach more importance to 
the maximization of over-tenure value, however, there are many factors interfering 
with the achievement of the latter, such as the imperfectness of corporate governance, 
the short-termism of the bankers, the hierarchical objective conflicts, etc. To 
systematically discuss the above-mentioned restrictive factors is far beyond the 
content of a doctoral dessertation. This paper chooses to discuss the influence of 
hierarchical objective conflicts in state-owned commercial banks on the maximization 
of over-tenure bank value on the basis of the banker’s utility function. The discussion 
of this issue not only has theoretical innovation significance, but also has exigent and 
important practical significance.  
Based on the brief introduction to the theoretical basis and literature review, this 
paper first discusses the connotation of “Bank value” and “Maximization of Bank 
Value”. We hold that the state-owned commercial banks should pursue value 
maximization based on benefit maximization of all the stakeholder. Hierarchical 
objective conflict is an important factor restricting the maximization of over-tenure  
bank value. This paper uses theoretical model to discuss the behavior differences 
triggered by the differences between utility function of branch bankers and that of 
head bankers under the objective function differences. It also discusses relevant 














puts forward suggestions on realizing maximization of over-tenure value of 
state-owned commercial banks from performance evaluation, risk management, 
internal audit and banker market and selection mechanism, etc.  
The major innovations of the thesis lay in the following aspects: firstly it makes 
systematic discussion on bank value and deep analysis on the maximization of bank 
value and over-tenure bank value, therefore fills in the blank of domestic and 
international systematic research in this field; secondly, the current literatures mostly 
concentrate on discussing the principal-agent issue between the state as the large 
shareholder and the manager of state-owned commercial banks, they seldom make 
systematic discussion on the influences of objective conflicts between branch banks 
and head bank on the maximization of over-tenure bank value, therefore this paper is 
quite innovative in its perspective of research. Besides, this paper establishes 
theoretical models to discuss the optimal incentive model design from three aspects, 
i.e. material, controlling power and branch banker’s career concerns. The model 
structure takes the existed practical problems into consideration, such as the multiple 
tasks of branch bankers, conflicts between long-term and short-term operation 
objectives and different performance indicator measurements for different tasks, etc. 
On this basis, the paper draws its conclusion and puts forward some suggestions.  
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